Secret Stealing via Model-Code Backdoors in Local LLM Fine-Tuning

Zi Li, Tian Zhou, Wenze Li, Jingyu Hua*, Yunlong Mao*, Sheng Zhong
State Key Laboratory of Novel Software Technology, Nanjing University

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MOTIVATION

COMMON PRACTICE

Teams fine-tune open-source LLMs locally and offline, on their own private data — API keys, medical records, internal documents.

THE OVERLOOKED DOOR

But loading that model first runs the code it ships with (trust_remote_code=True) — half of the 60 top Hugging Face models ask for it.


OUR FINDING

That code alone steals the data: >98% of secrets recovered exactly, provably genuine, and the victim is left no trace to find.

THREAT MODEL

The attacker's only foothold is the model code.

- **Air-gapped training** — nothing ever leaves the victim's machine: no network call, no hidden log.
- **No weight access** — the attacker never sees the checkpoint, only its public black-box API.
- **No poisoned data** — every training example is the victim's own, untouched.
- **No special prompt** — recovery needs only queries any ordinary user could send.



Paper · arXiv

Code · GitHub

Why this is realistic: 45,000+ Hugging Face repositories ship code that is auto-executed at load time, before a single training step runs. The attack touches neither the dataset, the weights, nor the training script.

METHOD — FOLLOWING ONE API KEY END TO END

One secret — the API key sk-live-7h2kQ... sitting in the victim's training file — followed end to end through the malicious model code.

STAGE I · LOCATE

The model code flags a high-entropy span — sk-live-7h2kQ... — inside the victim's own training batches from token statistics alone, with no semantic cue. It finds 98.9% of held-out secrets.


STAGE II · BIND

The secret is bound to an enumerable query key and wrapped with a self-check code, so months later the attacker can tell a genuine sk-live-... from a hallucinated guess.

STAGE III · INJECT

The pair is memorised through a separate gradient path while the loss the victim plots stays on its normal curve. After deployment, ordinary black-box queries return it.

Attacker-side cost is invisible: +13.8% step time, +134 MB VRAM (0.55%), no extra files, no network traffic.



RESULTS & STEALTH

>98%	<3%	≈0	0	0% → 98%
secrets recovered exactly 3 tasks × 4 model families	drop in the victim's task utility	visible change in the loss curve the victim sees	alerts from 4 static scanners + 30 LLM code audits	prior weight-poisoning vs. this attack

Main results · Llama-3.2-3B, LoRA (α ≈ 0.37% of weights)

Dataset	Strict ASR	Utility change
Magicoder	**98.38%**	−1.0%
HealthCareMagic	**100%**	−2.4%
AESLC	**99.08%**	−2.9%

Strict ASR — the secret and its check code are both exact. The semantic-prefix attack from prior work scores 0% on all three tasks.


Generality · 4 model families, 4 training paradigms

Llama-3.1-8B 100 / 99.9 / 99.5, Qwen-2.5-7B 100 / 99.9 / 100, Mistral-7B 100 / 100 / 98.8 (ASR %, three tasks). Full SFT 100%, LoRA 100%, QLoRA 90.4%, LoRA with the last 8 blocks frozen 99.8%.

Ablations · what the attack actually needs

Injecting into only the last 14 of 28 trainable layers already reaches 99.75%; with the replay buffer removed it collapses to 0%. The check code never rejects a true secret, and false-accepts stay ≤ 2.7%.

The victim sees a perfectly normal loss curve



Green (Return Loss) is what the victim's training script prints — it tracks clean fine-tuning almost exactly. The true objective, in orange, never reaches the log.

Stealthy against defenses. Against Llama-Guard the bypass rate rises from 23% to 94% under light encoding; ONION / perplexity filtering still leaves 99.89% ASR; gradient inversion recovers nothing. DP-SGD (ε=4) does stop it — at the cost of over half the fine-tuning benefit, and the same code can switch it off.

Local training is not a trust boundary — the real risk is executing untrusted model code.

Zi Li, Tian Zhou, Wenze Li, Jingyu Hua, Yunlong Mao, Sheng Zhong · State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Nanjing University · zili@smail.nju.edu.cn · paper & code: QR codes above